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If Indigenous law is understood at the time of treaty-making, it will reinforce the procedural 
aspects of dispute resolution through diplomacy and the settlement of “interpretative” 
difficulties in living within a treaty relationship. The author, who is an Anishinaabe lawyer from 
Treaty 3, recounts her understanding of how the treaty relationship was to be an experience 
of using both Indigenous law and principles alongside Canadian law and principles to restore 
relationships and treaty responsibilities. A Treaty 3 commitment to provide the “Queen’s 
Government’s ear” to the Anishinaabe treaty partners is explored, along with the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to examine if there are ways in law 
and in relationship to have lasting and co-equal processes to live within Treaty in Canada. The 
author also uses examples of recent litigation involving Treaty 3 to explain how section 35 
treaty rights claims are an ill-suited remedy for living within treaty relationships in Canada. 
* Sara Mainville is a partner at Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP in Toronto, Ontario and 
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ANISHINAABE AKI ARE THE lands known to my ancestors and relatives of the 
Anishinaabe Nation along the boundary waters of Minnesota (Rainy Lake and 
Lake of the Woods), in territory that would become Canada’s northwestern 
Ontario and south-eastern Manitoba. Tese lands were harsh even for the 
Anishinaabe, and the Dawson Route was the frst real agreement made between 
the British and Anishinaabe to create the “white man’s road” which also required 
British travellers to purchase Anishinaabe birch bark canoes and Anishinaabe 
timber to feed steamboats that travelled along this pre-Confederation 
passageway.1 Te Dawson expedition started a relationship of mutual beneft 
and mutual co-existence in the period from 1860 to 1869. Tis was a decade of 
relationship-building by people like Simon Dawson, who was an engineer who 
had several encounters with the Anishinaabe before Treaty 3 was signed by him 
and two other Treaty Commissioners on 3 October 1873. Teir knowledge and 
understanding of the Anishinaabe were helpful in gaining the trust that the treaty 
would be forever, a relationship of substance and diplomatic protocol between 
the British and the Anishinaabe Nation along the boundary waters. 
During litigation, courts have little time to hear the long recollections of 
Anishinaabe storytellers. Other evidence must be brought forward at great expense 
to bring some sort of understanding of these past treaty relationships. An example 
of this problem is the decade of relationship skipped over in the following 
introductory paragraph to Treaty 3 found in the Grassy Narrows decision:2 
1. Sara J Mainville, “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation Under Section 35” (2007) 6 
Indigenous LJ 141 at 151 [Mainville, “Treaty Councils”]. 
2. Grassy Narrows First Nations v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48 at para 1 
[Grassy Narrows]. 




In the early 1870s, Canada was a young country looking to promote Western 
expansion and Confederation. Settlers travelled west along an immigrant travel 
route called the Dawson Route, and British Columbia agreed to join Confederation 
on the condition that Canada build a transcontinental railway. But the immigrant 
travel route and the prospective railway to the west ran through traditional Ojibway 
land in what is now Northwestern Ontario and Eastern Manitoba. Canada was 
concerned about the security of immigrant travellers and surveyors preparing for 
the construction of the Canadian Pacifc Railway (“CPR”), and feared that it may 
need to station troops in the area. Securing a safe route through the Ojibway lands 
was critical for the addition of British Columbia to Confederation and to the 
development of the West. It was against this historical backdrop that Treaty 3, which 
is at the heart of this case, was negotiated. 
Te Court does not mention the help and aid that was being shared between 
the parties and the relationship being formalized through diplomatic protocols. 
Tere is also no mention of the importance of this relationship for peaceful 
co-existence in the ffty-fve thousand square miles that would be described in 
the Articles of Treaty as Treaty 3 territory. 
Whether or not Grassy Narrows First Nation had a treaty right to stop a 
regional government from clear-cutting their traditional territories was at the 
root of the litigation between the parties between 2003 to 2014. Te plaintifs 
had to create a “theory of a case” beyond mere consultation and accommodation 
that would permanently remedy the situation. Te problem of bringing a 
nation-to-nation treaty into one nation’s domestic court system is a larger matter— 
specifcally, what is the proper dispute resolution mechanism in nation-to-nation 
treaties? Te two dialogues seem like counter-narratives, but they were linked in 
our history of Anishinaabe protocols related to treaty enforcement. To be clear, 
I am a member of a Treaty 3 community, I have studied the treaty both in law 
school, through graduate studies, and by having several long conversations with 
Treaty 3 knowledge holders. I am also a practicing lawyer who works with Treaty 
3 clients. From 2008 to 2011, I was an advisor to the Grand Council and the 
Grand Council Chief, Ogichidaakwe Diane M Kelly.3 I also have some personal 
recollections of the eforts made by the Grand Council and infuential people in 
the Grand Council from 1997 to 2014 to keep the treaty protocols consistent 
with past customs. 
My understanding of the Grand Council Treaty 3 is informed by the Treaty 
3 Elders and some prominent leaders, most from the biizhew or lynx clan (my 
grandmother’s clan). Te Grand Council has existed since we found the manomiin 
3. Te Government of the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty #3, “Grand Council Treaty #3”, 
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(wild rice) at the height of land on a storied journey of the Anishinaabe from east 
to west on Turtle Island. Te Grand Council met during the spring and summer 
fsheries of Rainy River, Couchiching Falls, now more famous as the border 
crossing between Fort Frances, Ontario and International Falls, Minnesota. Te 
Grand Council is a meeting of four spiritual institutions (or houses), including 
the Mitewewin society, and it is both a spiritual and political gathering of the 
Anishinaabe people of the boundary waters. Ogichidaa, or “boundary warriors” 
would lead the discussions of the Council, and a Grand Chief has always been 
present, known in the early contact period with French explorers and fur 
traders as “Nittum” meaning “frst” in Anishinaabemowin (the language of the 
Anishinaabe) and “La Premier” in the French records.4 Tis Grand Council was 
always present and I have heard about Ogichidaa in my family (Gus Mainville), 
and of course in more well-known families from the Lake of the Woods area. Te 
frst ofcial corporate organization was developed in the 1970s, and the Grand 
Council Treaty 3 ofces were set up in a former residential school in what is now 
present-day Kenora, Ontario. 
It is an interesting position for a person that does not believe that my treaty 
belongs in a domestic court to be writing an article about the recent litigation 
history of Treaty 3. My legal and political career has focused on encouraging 
our treaty partner to see the future wisdom in their representatives advancing 
nation-to-nation dispute resolution to resolve interpretative diferences in 
implementing Treaty 3. My legal career has focused on the implementation 
of Treaty 3 and understanding of how treaty councils and Indigenous law can 
play a central role in nation-to-nation dispute resolution. My belief is that it 
is in the process of becoming familiar with one another in formal diplomacy, 
on a nation-to-nation basis, that we will understand the importance of both 
interdependence and independence between the parties. Treaties, in my view, 
allow parties to mutually agree to the boundaries of the relationship, and the 
interdependencies in formal arrangements. Te substance of the treaty council 
will be to properly work through interpretative difculties and prescribed dispute 
resolution on this basis. Tis builds a friendship and common interests of working 
through disputes and better defning a government-to-government relationship. 
Given my knowledge of Treaty 3 claims, I am not surprised that Anishinaabeg 
have brought their Treaty with the Queen to a domestic Canadian court. Is this a 
modern form of “hunting” down the Queen? What are the “rules that govern us 
4. Leo Waisberg & Tim Holzkamm, “‘We Have One Mind and One Mouth. It Is the Decision 
of All of Us’ Traditional Anishinaabe Governance of Treaty #3” (2001) Grand Council Treaty 
#3 Working Paper at 6. 








rightly” in making treaty litigation acceptable to the Anishinaabe Nation of the 
Boundary Waters, now self-proclaimed as the Anishinaabe Nation of Treaty 3? 
To answer these questions, I will use my experience and understandings of Grand 
Council protocols to explain how the original litigation was decided amongst us, 
such that we were all “of one mind” prior to Statements of Claim being fnalized 
on behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation. I do this in order to explain how a “once in 
a lifetime” hunting down has been squandered and so that we are more prepared 
if we need to use the extraordinary remedy of litigation ever again. 
Te relationship between the parties has been more than adversarial; in fact, 
it is an abusive and untrusting relationship with the Crown, a relationship in 
need of an urgent prescription to bring it back to balance. Will the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)5 make a diference here? 
Is there a better way of dispute resolution with legal and procedural remedies 
against the Crown now that the Federal government has committed to the 
implementation of the Declaration? In particular, Article 37 of UNDRIP declares:6 
Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement 
of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States 
or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements 
and other constructive agreements. 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the 
rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive 
agreements. 
“Recognition, observance and enforcement” of treaties is the impasse 
that the Anishinaabe benefciaries of Treaty 3 fnd themselves in. Tere are no 
domestic forums or mechanisms to establish a mutually agreeable process here. 
Te specifc claims and self-government policies of the federal government are so 
circumscribed by colonial perceptions of certainty, mutuality, and fnality that it 
is not safe or advisable to enter these discussions from a historic reconciliation 
perspective.7 Federal governments want to renegotiate terms to create a “modern 
treaty” that establishes very clear powers and authorities between the parties in a 
5. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 295, UNGAOR, 61st 
Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/Res/61/295 [UNDRIP]. 
6. Ibid at Article 37. 
7. Treaty knowledge keepers honour the historic reconciliation achieved in the solemnized 
treaties, as the Creator and others have sanctioned these agreements in ceremony. Te 
historic reconciliation in Treaty 3 is an understanding of what was agreed to, and that both 
Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin (an Indigenous legal order) and the British common law rules 
were applicable in ensuring that each party upheld their commitments and obligations 
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way that strips away the Indigenous law, protocols, and ceremonies that are core 
to what the treaty relationship is. 
Tis article involves my understanding of Treaty 3, a treaty made by my 
nation, the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters, represented by a Grand 
Council,8 and the Queen, who represented her Nation. On the last day of treaty 
negotiations, 3 October 1873, our principal spokesperson, Mawendopenais9 
promised to “hunt” down the Treaty Commissioners personally, as representatives 
of the Queen in England, if the treaty was breached. Tis was not an idle threat; 
Mawendopenais was a formidable man, accustomed to dress in the traditional 
way of an Ogichidaa, or boundary warrior of our nation. His face was likely 
painted, and he stood much taller than most men. Tis Anishinaabe threat made 
personally against Canada’s ofcials was dealt with quickly and diplomatically. 
Treaty Commissioner and main spokesperson for the Crown, Lieutenant 
8. A Grand Council is an institution of the Anishinaabeg, it is both spiritual and political and it 
has the ceremonial and spiritual connections to bind the Nation together through protocol, 
diplomacy and law. Tere are Midewewin leadership, both women and men, as well as the 
political leadership and boundary warriors present to discuss matters of importance to the 
Nation at the Grand Councils, many times in the past Grand Councils convened in both 
Fall and Spring Assemblies. Grand Councils were ever present in the encounter era with 
the French and English near Couchiching Falls on the Minnesota/Ontario border near Fort 
Frances, Ontario. See e.g. Waisberg & Holzkamm, supra note 4. 
9. Mawendopenais, I imagine the sketch at the beginning of this article was done after a reading 
a reporter’s account of the Governor General’s visit of Rat Portage (near Kenora, ON) on 
18 August 1881 that described the Anishinaabe Ogichidaa. See “Te Great Chief of the 
Ojibways”, Te New York Times 3 September 1881: 
Mawindobenesse, the great chief, is certainly one of the fnest-looking Indians I have ever 
seen, and though he was carefully supported as he walked up from his canoe, it turned out 
that all this apparent infrmity was merely put on to magnify his greatness in the eyes of 
the distinguished visitors who eyes he supposed to be upon him, for as soon as the dancing 
commenced he was one of the frst to engage in it, and he was quite as ready to keep it up as 
were any of his subjects. though he has a grand pair of shoulders, straight and broad, without 
the smallest inclination to stoop, a full chest, symmetrically tapered toward the waist, and 
though, in short, Mawindobenesse has a remarkably fne fgure, it is his face that makes the 
strongest impression in one’s memory. He has a broad, high forehead that recedes slightly and 
regularly, almost or quite from the eyebrows. His eyes are decidedly good, though partially 
thrown back by his prominent brows and cheek bones. His nose has just enough of the eagle’s 
beak about it to escape being Grecian, his mouth has plenty of frmness and unmistakable 
in expression while his lower jaw would indicate that he had all the physical courage, but 
none of the brutality, of the successful prize-fghter. He looks like a man of superior courage, 
intelligence, and character, and in looking at him it would be hard to divest one’s self of the 
idea that he was not devoid of culture. 








Governor Alexander Morris made this key commitment, “Te Queen’s Ear is 
promised to you.”10 
Tese forgotten or ignored treaty claims are extraordinary, and the efort 
to see the light of day in a courtroom is a testament to the resiliency of our 
First Nation communities. Tere are so many barriers to litigation, including the 
impecuniosity of the First Nations and the cost of litigation. It is no wonder that 
we turn to the UNDRIP to aford us other forums for treaty dispute resolution. 
In fact, I would argue for a specialized court co-developed between the parties, 
including the important step that any treaty court would be given life by
Miinigoziiwin (Anishinaabe legal order) and Canada’s Constitution.11 It would 
be truly an international court of a sui generis nature. Tis would be the better 
forum, but procedural rules need to be co-developed between the parties in light 
of the Declaration and the commitment to have justice and reciprocity between 
the treaty partners in Canada. 
A second Article in UNDRIP that is relevant to my argument is Article 27: 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples 
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving 
due recognition to [I]ndigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure 
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples, pertaining 
to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to 
participate in this process. 
Tis institution does not exist in Canada. Canadian courts have become 
an untrusted and biased forum for section 35 rights-holders, particularly, any 
inherent or Indigenous legal right holder or authority. Te UNDRIP does have 
some promising “reconciliation” ingredients, but only if those ingredients include 
co-development with Indigenous peoples to create the fnal recipe and solution. 
10. Keewatin v Minister of Natural Resources, 2011 ONSC 4801 at para 367 [“Keewatin 2011”]. 
“Te following are the terms of the treaty held at Northwest Angle the third day of October, 
Eighteen Hundred and Seventy Tree”, Appendix A in Report on the Negotiations for Treaty 3 
by Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris, Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (RG 10, vol 
1918, fle 2790B, con C-11110). Te shorthand reporter’s notes observe: “Te Queen’s ear 
would always be open to hear her Indian Subjects.” 
11. Te Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 is, while section 35 is located in 
Part II of Constitution Act, 1982. Te remedy for the breach of Section 35 may be found in 
section 52, which reads: “Te Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
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With this article, I attempted to advance Anishinaabe custom on how to be 
“of one mind” in using domestic courts to “hunt down” persons and governments 
responsible for a breach of their sacred treaty obligations, hunting down being 
the prerogative treaty remedy that the Anishinaabe kept for themselves.12 I also 
argue that the common law is so ill-suited for treaty rights recognition, that 
Crown intervention is procedurally necessary at the very beginning. Canada 
should prioritize eforts with Indigenous partners to establish a path forward to 
implement the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 45,13 that 
is the ultimate path to fxing treaty relationships. Until then, temporary solutions 
like the recently announced Litigation Guidelines will be a controversial measure 
inside of the Department of Justice, which may not receive full implementation 
because of stronger beliefs in the adversarial system of litigation in Canada. 
An example very connected to the Treaty 3 litigation discussed in this article is 
guideline number 15 that states:14 
Canada respects the right of Indigenous peoples and nations to defne themselves 
and counsel’s pleadings and other submissions must respect the proper rights-
bearing collective. Where rights and title have been asserted on behalf of larger 
Indigenous entities—nations or linguistic groups, for example—and there are no 
conficting interests, Canada in the proper case, or where supported by the available 
evidence, will not object to the entitlement of those groups to bring the litigation. 
Tis approach is consistent with principle 1, which afrms the Government of 
Canada’s renewed nation-to-nation approach. In Aboriginal rights and title cases, 
Canada will not usually plead that smaller Indigenous entities—clans or extended 
family groups, for example—are the proper holders of Aboriginal rights and title. 
12. Given the information that the Anishinaabe had about the Robinson Superior treaty and the 
Minnesota treaties and “slow” or non-implementation of treaty obligations, Mawendopenais, 
speaking for the people advanced what I term a prerogative power of “hunting down” treaty 
breakers. As the sovereign power over the given territory at the time of treaty-making it 
was important for Mawendopenais to explain that there would be personal consequences 
for breaking Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin, or the creator’s rule, whichever was the case. Tis 
was not an illegitimate remedy, I would argue, as Ogichidaa are boundary warriors and 
responsible for keeping the peace. 
13. See e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Calls to Action (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015) at 4. 
Section IV of Call to Action 45 reads: “Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and 
legal orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including 
the recognition and integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and 
implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements.” 
14. Canada, Department of Justice, Te Attorney General’s Directive on Civil Litigation Involving 
Indigenous Peoples, 2018, online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/ 
litigation-litiges.html>. 
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I attempted to explain through example, how treaty litigation has created 
even deeper relations of animosity with the Crown and may feed violence if 
the treaty relationship is damaged beyond repair. It is unlikely that the above 
Litigation Guidelines will continue to exist after the next federal election, but they 
provide a temporary solution and promise of dealing with an issue outlined in the 
litigation discussed in this article. 
So what to do with the breach of a procedural treaty right and the forgetting of 
this important diplomatic relationship? I realize that to most legal academics and 
lawyers, who want to advance treaty litigation, my approach seems questionable; 
why fght for a remedy that is normative when you can get a strong legal ruling 
through rights recognition in section 35 of Constitution Act, 1982?15 
Tere are several retellings of Treaty 3, as it is my understanding that the 
Anishinaabe treaty protocol is to remember treaties through oral understandings 
of the treaty. It is the role of the “recorder” or, a person having extraordinary 
memory to ofcially retell the version of the treaty to the Grand Council. 
In Canada, there was not a similar oral tradition, and like the Robinson Treaties 
before it, a “quit claim” deed called “Articles of a Treaty” was drafted to memorialize 
Treaty 3 prior to 3 October 1873. Both Simon Dawson and Alexander Morris 
took their own personal notes of their discussions with the Anishinaabe, as may 
have been European tradition, or their independent responsibility as appointed 
Treaty Commissioners. Simon Dawson’s notes are more culturally acceptable to 
Anishinaabe readers and historians, likely because of his long experience working 
with the Anishinaabe of the boundary waters region.16 
Te Grand Council Treaty 3 was revitalized in various periods of treaty 
relationships with Canada. Te Grand Council was ever-present in early European 
relationships since the seventeenth century. Te main spokesperson was called “La 
Premier” in early fur-trading accounts and also Niitum or “frst among equals” 
as the Grand Chief of the Nation.17 Tere is an unpublished account of this early 
history completed by Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) historians, 
Leo Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm, called “We Have One Mind and One Mouth. 
It is the Decision of All of Us” Traditional Anishinaabe Governance of Treaty 
#3” that shares several of these early contact reports with the Grand Chief and 
15. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 9, s 35. 
16. See e.g. Alexander Morris, Te Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the 
North-West Territories, Including the Negotiations on Which Tey Were Based, and Other 
Information Relating Tereto (Bedfords, Clarke, 1880) at 72 [Morris, Treaties] (“Te ear of the 
Queen’s Government will always be open to hear the complaints of her Indian people, and 
she will deal with her servants that do not do their duty in a proper manner.”). 
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the Grand Council. Also, one of the most important documents created by the 
Grand Council Treaty 3 is this “We have kept our part of the Treaty document” 
that can still be viewed online at the Grand Council Treaty 3 website, this is a 
list of the treaty-based grievances in 1990. Tis document is an overview of the 
various land-based treaty grievances of the Grand Council. However, rather than 
being granted the Queen’s ear to listen to these well-documented grievances, the 
First Nations themselves were told that they would need to remedy their claims 
through the specifc claims policy of Indian Afairs in 1976. 
I. REFLECTING ON WHAT MADE TREATY 3 A 
RECONCILIATION WORTH NATIONAL COMMEMORATION 
Te shorthand reporter’s note is my favourite retelling of the promise of procedural 
justice for the Anishinaabe. It is more in line with Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin, 
the “law and order” of my Nation, based on the fact that the Queen must listen to 
the Anishinaabe in the future—as part of their treaty relationship. It is a promise 
fashioned to illicit inter-cultural understanding, as the Anishinaabe did not speak 
English, nor, did they understand the Canadian legal or political order. Tey 
were told that, the Queen would listen to you if you had grievances, implying 
in the British constitutional tradition of the time, that the Queen had certain 
powers and a special role and that she would personally be responsible to fx or 
remedy the problem. 
In the meantime, in the decade after Treaty 3 was made, Mawendopenais 
was doing his part to enforce the treaty. For example, he was actively advocating 
against being forced to build a school-house on-reserve prior to receiving a school 
teacher in his community. He demanded to be shown in Canada’s “Articles 
of a Treaty” where it said that that schoolhouses were a pre-condition to the 
“education” guarantee in Treaty 3.18 Other grievances would be heard by Canada’s 
ofcials (including Alexander Morris and Simon Dawson, who was a Member of 
Parliament for the District of Algoma) from delegations of Chiefs who went 
18. “We Have Kept our Part of the Treaty” Anishinaabe Understanding of Treaty #3 (Grand 
Council Treaty #3, October 2011) at 44. 
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to Winnipeg and Tunder Bay to make good on their promise to enforce the 
treaty themselves.19 
In this article, I argue that the right for the Anishinaabe was to take up a 
process that would efectively “hunt down” or prosecute a treaty breaker. Te 
focus would have been on the men who negotiated the treaty, Alexander Morris, 
Simon Dawson, and Joseph Provencher. Alexander Morris was subject to various 
delegations from the Anishinaabe in the period after the treaty was made.20 
However, colonialism would weaken the resolve of the Anishinaabe Nation, 
as the Grand Council had to meet secretly. Tere were early twentieth century 
newspaper accounts of panicked Euro-Canadian neighbours, as the military was 
ordered in when the Anishinaabe left the reserve for ceremonies.21 Further, the 
Indian Act was over-policing their original civil society, ceremonies and languages, 
which could not be practiced after the 1890s. Notably, lawyers could not even 
work for Indian Act bands until after changes to the Indian Act in 1951. 
II. TREATY COUNCILS AS DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
So it is not surprising that Mawendopenais would attend with some pomp and 
circumstance, to meet the Governor General in Canada in 1881. Te Queen’s 
foremost representative stopping to meet with the Anishinaabe, less than eight 
years after a treaty would be a very special event. Tere is not much of a record 
beyond the newspaper account of Mawendopenais, and not any mention of a 
specifc meeting or discussion between the two nations in the fall of that year. What 
would have happened if there was a true government to government meeting? 
Would the Governor General have explained the plans to impose Indian Act
and Indian Act governance on the Anishinaabeg who still had hereditary Chiefs 
and traditional governance? Would they have carefully explained that children 
would soon be forcibly removed from families to go to Christian schools between 
1900 and 1902 in both Fort Frances and Kenora, Ontario? Tese would all be 
an impossible discussion in a true treaty relationship. Te discussions would be 
especially difcult with this relatively strong Anishinaabe Nation, who had kept 
Christian Missionaries away from their communities for a century and jealously 
19. I have reviewed Canada’s archive materials on treaty grievances for my LLM thesis. See 
Sara J Mainville, Manidoo Mazina’igan: An Anishinaabe Perspective of Treaty 3 (LLM Tesis, 
University of Toronto, 2007) [unpublished] [Mainville, Manidoo]. See also Brian Walmark, 
Alexander Morris and the Saulteaux: Te Context and Making of Treaty Tree, 1869–73 (MA 
Tesis, Lakehead University, 1993) [unpublished] at 31. 
20. Mainville, Manidoo, supra note 19. 
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guarded their Midewewin (a centuries old organized, spiritual society). Of course, 
it is unlikely that these discussions were had. A ceremonial leader like Governor 
General Sir John Douglas Campbell (who was on an expedition of promoting 
western farming in Canada),22 was unlikely to want to alarm Mawendopenais 
and his men. Te usurping power of colonialism is an ongoing narrative that 
delays and aggravates the treaty relationship. It has no transparency and colonial 
forces do not seek consent from peoples who they believe are of inferior race or 
religious customs. 
Justice for treaty rights holders was the remedial promise of section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, a reconciliatory process to further insure peaceful 
relations between the parties despite a long history of animosity as opposed to 
friendship. Tis “remedy” was also promised in the specifc claims process to 
treaty rights holders, post Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia 23 after 
the federal government formally established a native claims policy in 1974. Te 
Grand Council Treaty 3 is proud to be of the opinion that they established the 
frst “Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research” ofce in the country.24 However, 
there is a history of Treaty 3 claims being stopped and restarted because of the 
lack of resources and capacity of communities to carry these expensive and 
complicated processes forward. 
Tere is important history of treaty-making involving who negotiated the 
treaty on behalf of the Anishinaabe, the Ogichidaa spokespeople including 
Powassin and Mawendopenais were tested warriors and were high ranking 
Mitewewin (medicine society) members. Te word “obstinate” was used by 
Justice Sanderson in her lengthy review of the making of treaty 3, and the Chiefs 
22. Te Canadian West, “Governor General’s Party Crossing Lake of the Woods 1881, 
by Sydney Prior Hall” (31 August 2001), online: <www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/ 
canadian-west/052920/05292014_e.html>. 
23. See Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313 at 328 [Calder]. Calder
established claims for Aboriginal title and rights within the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
recognition that: 
the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and 
occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. Tis is what Indian title means 
and it does not help one in the solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary 
right”. What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on their 
lands as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished. 
Tere can be no question that this right was “dependent on the goodwill of the Sovereign.” 
24. My friend and former co-worker, Andy Sky says that the TARR unit was established 
well before 1976. 










lack of true desire to make a Treaty with Canada in the Keewatin v Ontario.25 
In fact, Elder Allan White26 had told me on more than one occasion, that the 
Anishinaabe Nation had sent scouts to Montreal to see if we, the Anishinaabeg, 
could win a war with the British. Unfortunately (or fortunately), the report back 
was that the best course for us was to make a treaty with the British based on what 
was viewed in Montreal as the British military power. I can only imagine the 
Grand Council meeting where this report back was made and the careful strategy 
that was created to broker a treaty with the Queen. 
Another important development was that the Anishinaabe had hired literate 
French–Anishinaabemowin interpreters, who wrote down the terms agreed to, 
in a French document. Tese terms, also known as the Nolin Notes, expand 
on the other written records, as does Simon Dawson’s notes, a “short-hand 
reporter’s” notes made during the discussions, and a newspaper account of the 
treaty council of 1873, found in “Te Manitoban” newspaper.27 Tese many 
varied contemporaneously created records of what was agreed to in the four-day 
Treaty Council, should illustrate how easily the problem of hearing simultaneous 
interpretations and translations could vary the meaning of what was said, what 
was asked and ofered, and what was mutually agreed to. Tis problem deepens 
when you understand the vast inter-cultural diferences that existed between the 
British and the Anishinaabeg in 1873. 
Te Anishinaabe near Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods had established 
an agreement, that would likely be considered a treaty, for the so-called Dawson 
route, the canoe and road route completed in 1870 for military and other British 
expeditions to cross our territory, before 1860, and that treaty was breached early 
on. Te three-dollar annuity agreed to with Simon Dawson, along with various 
identifed breaches, such as the taking of timber for steam-boats, were grievances 
discussed at length at the beginning of the 1873 treaty council.28 Tis former 
25. Keewatin 2011, supra note 10 at para 51. 
26. Elder Allan White is a citizen of Naotkamegwanning First Nation otherwise known as 
Whitefsh Bay. He grew up with oral tradition of our people surrounding him, his father 
was the last Anishinaabe judge that he could remember. Te practices of Anishinaabe 
judges is another tradition in our Nation that I am discovering and learning about. See e.g.
Aimée Craft, “Anishinaabe Nibi Inaakonigewin Report: Refecting the Water Laws Research 
Gathering conducted with Anishinaabe Elders” (2014) at 4, 15, online: <create-h2o.ca/ 
pages/annual_conference/presentations/2014/ANI_Gathering_Report_-_June24.pdf>. 
27. For an extensive review of “the documents” of Treaty 3 see, Keewatin, 2011, supra note 10 
at para 308-88. 
28. See Morris, Treaties, supra note 16 at 55. Morris writes: “Promises had many times been 
made to them, and, said the speaker, unless they were now fulflled they would not consider 
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breach of terms would have informed the Anishinaabe Chiefs, through very 
contemporary experience, that an efective procedural remedy would be required 
for any new treaty with the Queen and her men. 
Clearly, it had been a long time since the “Queen’s government ear” was 
available to the Anishinaabe. My record is that sometime between the trial and 
the fnal appeal in St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber, which ended in 1888,29 the 
treaty councils had stopped. Te fnal ruling resulted in an aggressive provincial 
hand in changing treaty arrangements, including the extinguishment of reserves 
along the fertile Rainy River watershed and the Quetico Provincial Park.30 At the 
same time, the building of navigational and hydro dams led to Winnipeg-basin 
fooding all along the Lake of the Woods, English River, and Rainy Lake 
watersheds. By this time, the Crown was aware that the relationship with the 
Anishinaabe was breached, almost beyond repair. Te dust had not settled on 
all of the unilateral changes made between Ontario and Canada (in various 
boundary disputes and litigation) until the fnal negotiations achieved provincial 
approval of the Treaty 3 reserves in 1915. But, by that time, the Spanish fu and 
poverty had decimated the population of the boundary waters Anishinaabe, not 
to mention the destruction and havoc that Indian Residential Schools were to 
cause upon our communities into the next century. 
III. INTERNAL RULES ESTABLISHED BY THE GRAND 
COUNCIL TO PROTECT THE TREATY 
From the 1980s to the 1990s, the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research (TARR) 
unit worked with two Canadian lawyers who have stayed connected to the Grand 
Council through their work into the new millennium to forward various claims 
related to fooding throughout the territory. Tese lawyers have held long-term 
relationships with the First Nations and understanding of the original claim 
coordinating role of the Grand Council. Tere was a formal protocol developed 
during the TARR unit’s initial research years, and that was agreed to through the 
29. St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber v Te Queen (1888), LR 14 AC 46 (PC). 
30. Rainy River First Nations’ land claim was settled in 2003 related to the loss of reserve 
lands along the Rainy River and the Sturgeon Lake Band claim (Quetico Park lands) is still 
underway after years of negotiations. For an account of the Ontario/Canada negotiations to 
fnalize Treaty 3 reserves and extinguish the Sturgeon Lake reserve, see Wayne E Daugherty, 
“Treaty Research Report – Treaty Tree [1873]: Treaties and Historical Research Centre, 
Self-Government”, (Indian and Northern Afairs Canada, Ottawa 1986), online: <www. 
rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-CIRNAC-RCAANC/DAM-TAG/STAGING/texte-text/ 
tre3_1100100028672_eng.pdf>. 







Grand Council Treaty 3. Te centralized TARR unit and the two historians, Leo 
Waisberg and Tim Holzkamm had established the claim documents as advised 
by the various community-hired lawyers. Because of these central research 
eforts, it was acknowledged that the team knew who had the strongest claims for 
purposes of litigation. 
If a community was forced to bring the treaty to court, the protocol held 
that the plaintif, or defendant (if it was a treaty right defence), would need to 
be sanctioned by the Grand Council Treaty 3, through the “Chiefs in Assembly.” 
Moreover, other communities would consider supporting the claim through small 
monetary contributions if they could aford to help with the fundraising efort. 
Tis was before 1990. At this time, there were fled claims around the subject 
matter of the “headlands guarantee,” wild rice, fsheries, timber claims, and most 
First Nations had advanced their reserve claims for treaty land entitlement and 
fooding damages.31 
IV. THE TREATY 3 LITIGATION WAR CHEST 
In addition to litigation, First Nations and the Grand Council asserted demands 
for consultation and resource revenue-sharing in Treaty 3 territory to protect 
their inherent authority, and their vision of the treaty relationship once Section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was in place. In 1994, an agreement was reached 
with Bell Canada that allowed their secondary fbre-optic corridor through the 
southern portion of the territory including six First Nation reserves. During that 
process, Bell Canada also funded the Grand Council in their eforts to create a 
written law called Manito Aki Inakonigaawin, the Great Earth Law. Tis law 
was written down because it applied to industry and “authorized” development 
was now a requirement under Treaty 3. Of course, writing down the law was not 
creating the law, it was a law that had existed in Anishinaabemowin for a very 
31. David T McNab, “Te Administration of Treaty #3: Te Location of the Boundaries of 
Treaty #3 Indian Reserves in Ontario”, in Ian Getty & Antoine Lussier, eds, As Long As 
Te Sun Shines and Water Flows (UBC Press, 1983) 148 at 148: “By extending the existing 
shoreline boundaries to a line, drawn from headland to headland, the Indian reserves 
would be greatly increased in size and the Indian bands would have exclusive control of the 
fshery and wild rice in that [bay] area.” Te 1894 agreement and it’s headlands guarantee 
disappeared in future implementation of the treaty discussions between Ontario, Canada, 
and the Anishinaabe in the twentieth century. “Headlands” claims have been established by 
Treaty 3 communities and brought before the Province of Ontario in the Grand Council 
Treaty #3’s political “table” discussions with the Ministry of Indigenous Relationships and 
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long time. It was the “process” that was written down to give some certainty 
to industry that there was a clear path to receive an authorization from the 
Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3. 
Bell Canada wanted access to the six independent reserves in order to support 
its fbre-optic network, but it agreed to a revenue sharing agreement that was 
formulated based on the Treaty 3 territory as a whole. Approximately 150,000 
dollars was received every year into the “Bell FOTS3 fund” by Grand Council 
Treaty 3. Tere was a misunderstanding about who was the “benefciary” of the 
fund created by the Bell Canada payments over those twenty years from 1994 
to 2014. Te six First Nations clarifed at the very end of the agreement, during 
renewal talks, that Bell Canada made the payments in order to have access to 
their six reserves only. Eventually, those First Nations accessed the funds in the 
Grand Council Treaty 3 bank account and depleted it between 2015 and 2016. 
Prior to this, it was considered the Anishinaabe Nation in Treaty 3’s litigation 
war chest. As a result, the Grand Council had withdrawn signifcant monies for 
litigation from the war chest between 2012 and 2015. 
Te Great Earth Law did not fuel a large war chest for treaty litigation 
beyond the Bell Canada funding. Given the uncertainties around process and 
spending the monies, the fund was invested well and grew from 1994 to 2008. 
When I worked for the Grand Chief, we often felded discussions about access to 
the monies for a variety of reasons of signifcant importance to the communities. 
As lawyers, the Grand Chief and I often discussed legal strategy around the Grand 
Council meetings, and there was an expectation that some type of litigation 
would come before the Grand Council. 
Earlier in 2000, the people at the Grand Council Treaty 3 signed the 
Millennium Declaration to ensure that their Assemblies would be more 
transparent, especially for important decisions of the Nation. Tis Declaration 
required that during the spring and fall assemblies, the Nation would convene as 
a National Assembly for the frst two days of the Assembly, and the fnal third day 
would be for the Chiefs in Assembly to make decisions to implement the Nation’s 
will. Tis was an attempt to decolonize the Grand Council Treaty 3 which was 
criticized for being too connected to the Indian Act authority of the Chief and 
Councils. Te Assemblies have been operating in this way ever since. 
Te Millennium Declaration has been the goal that I hold most Grand Council 
Treaty 3 decisions against, that we try to make decisions as a Nation in Assembly. 
Unfortunately, it is more often than not that we fail to meet this standard in our 
most important deliberations. Decisions at the National Assembly were thought 
to be more inclusive of the Nation and involved better decision-making. We tried 






to revitalize the famous Mawendopenais closing speech (for Treaty 3, 3 October 
1873) of doing our business “openly and in the light of day” so that our decisions 
would be inclusive and fnal, as Mawendopenais had explained, there should be 
“no grumbling” by the Anishinaabe after the treaty was made. However, the “no 
grumbling” only works if the participants feel strong enough and empowered 
enough to voice their important concerns and objections. Te concerns about the 
litigation strategy were voiced by the First Nations’ legal counsel at meetings of 
legal counsel and it became clear that we were not truly “all of one mind” about 
the litigation agenda that we approved. 
V. STOPPING CLEARCUTTING IN THE KEEWATIN LANDS 
All of these developments to “open the war chest” would have been greatly 
disappointing to the community of Grassy Narrows First Nation, as they were 
independently litigating a treaty-based judicial review up to 2005, when the 
Ontario Superior Court decided that the litigation must take form of a more 
expensive action and trial. Tis was much more expensive for the community 
who was wrestling with a number of issues, including mercury poisoning within 
its community after decades of negligence by the provincial Ministry of the 
Environment. Grassy Narrow’s Trapping Council had asked to bring the treaty 
to court and they had also asked to access the war chest for its litigation. While 
Grassy Narrows were granted approval and support for the judicial review, 
no fnancial support was forthcoming. Te war chest was still inaccessible at 
this time. Grassy Narrows was forced to bring an advanced cost motion into 
the litigation now that it was a full trial, which arguably limited their ability to 
fully litigate the substantive issues in the best way possible.32 Te Grassy Narrows 
“impecuniosity” was relied on for the advanced costs motion, but also made it 
challenging to coordinate legal strategy with friendly parties. 
32. See Keewatin v Ontario (Minister Of Natural Resources) (2006), 32 CPC (6th) 258 (ONSC) 
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Te cost and coordination of a large treaty claim is probably best illustrated 
in the Grassy Narrows litigation.33 Once the trial of this matter began, there 
were procedural motions before it, which seems to always be the case in section 
35 disputes with the Crown. One motion was about “who” were the proper 
representatives of the Grassy Narrows claim. Tis claim was frst established by 
the Grassy Narrows Trapper’s Council, namely Willie and Andrew Keewatin and 
Joseph William Fobister. It was these members who brought the litigation to 
the Grand Council for their approval, to bring the treaty to court. Chief Simon 
Fobister was also a supporter of this litigation and he attended court with the 
plaintifs. Chief Fobister was the Deputy Grand Chief of Grand Council Treaty 
3 and he was very aware of Grand Council Treaty 3 protocol and what was 
happening on their agenda. 
Te Crown argued that it would be necessary to name Grassy Narrows First 
Nation formally as part of the representative action “jointly and severally liable” 
for any costs award if the potential of costs awards for court procedure was granted 
against the plaintifs. Obviously, this had a chilling efect of anyone joining this 
trial prematurely. Te Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) argued that 
the plaintifs, if not the band council, could be less disciplined because the Indian 
Act protected their personal assets from seizure. Te Band Council would not be 
as immune from such actions. Te court decided that it was premature to name 
Grassy Narrows as a plaintif, or to make the band jointly and severally liable.34 
Te court in that decision also laid out in some detail the cost added to the 
plaintif, now that the court procedure was a more expensive trial/action, rather 
than the planned judicial review, at the Superior Court of Ontario:35 
Te costs of litigating this case for the plaintifs are estimated at just over $2.8 
million. Tis fgure is based on a detailed budget for an estimated 12-week trial 
on all issues and it provides for use of experts (scientifc, historical, archival, and 
anthropological). 
33. See Keewatin v Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources) (2003), 66 OR (3d) 370 (Ont Div 
Ct). Tis case started as a judicial review, but Abitibi-Consolidated and Ontario won a 
motion to quash the judicial review, forcing the plaintifs to spend the next two to three years 
organizing the case as a more expensive action in Court with a fuller hearing and evidentiary 
record. I was an articling student in 2005 at Sierra Legal Defence Fund (“SLDF”, which is 
now Ecojustice) where one of my frst duties was to send many of the judicial review fles to 
the BC law frm that would now fully represent Grassy Narrows in the new trial. SLDF was 
supporting the judicial review of Grassy Narrows. Grassy Narrows quickly looked to the law 
of advanced costs to advocate for cost-sharing between the parties. 
34. See Keewatin, 2006, supra note 32 at para 6. 
35. Ibid at paras 71-73. 





Most of the work by counsel for Grassy Narrows has gone unpaid, and most of what 
has been collected has been paid not by Grassy Narrows, but Sierra Legal Defence 
Fund. 
Grassy Narrows paid Cook Roberts LLP a bill of $18,391.54 in December 2005. 
Grassy Narrows obtained this money by making a special request to INAC for the 
Band’s Ottawa trust fund monies. 
In addition to the cost of the trial were the costs of the appeal to the Court 
of Appeal for Ontario and to the Supreme Court of Canada. Costs were awarded 
on a partial indemnity basis in advance by the courts involved.36 Tis would 
also later include the party of the Wabauskang First Nation, who was added as 
a party in the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Grassy Narrows, Wabauskang, and Lac Seul were together, one Anishinaabe 
community around 1873. 
Te proper rights-holder in the Grassy Narrows decision was worked out 
by the legal team representing the most interested communities who were 
neighbouring the claimant. However, my experience as an advisor to the 
Ogichidaakwe (Grand Chief ) in Grand Council Treaty 3 as the trial went on and 
during the application deadlines on appeal for interventions, was that there were 
strong concerns about the treaty representation and fairness for the outstanding 
land claims. At the time, there was a concern about the “reserve creation” issue as 
it was being discussed in specifc claims, fooding negotiations by several teams 
across the territory on behalf of more than fourteen First Nation communities in 
Treaty 3. Te Treaty 3 issue of when reserves were created, included arguments 
that reserves were created after survey and counter-arguments that involve 
the Ontario-Canada negotiations where Ontario held back Ontario’s consent 
to 1915 for the reserves. Ontario’s consent would seem to be a requirement 
in Canadian law after the Weywaykum decision in 2002. Tis would greatly 
diminish “damages” for food claim settlements if the issue was commented on 
prior to being properly in front of the of a decision-maker.37 Te Grassy Narrows 
trial was all about the evidence related to the negotiations and settlements around 
36. Grassy Narrows, supra note 2 at para 55, Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 
158 at para 235. 
37. See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 at para 15. Wewaykum stated that: 
Federal-provincial cooperation was required in the reserve-creation process because, while 
the federal government had jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” 
under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Crown lands in British Columbia, on which 
any reserve would have to be established, were retained as provincial property. Any unilateral 
attempt by the federal government to establish a reserve on the public lands of the province 
would be invalid… 
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Ontario boundaries that included the fnalization of reserve creation for Treaty 
3. Several Treaty 3 communities intervened in the two appeals. Tis created 
additional delay and expense for Grassy Narrows, who were being funded on a 
partial indemnity basis. 
Most litigators will explain how complex treaty litigation is generally, 
and how much more complex Treaty 3 litigation is because of the division of 
powers and boundaries issues being settled between the Crown governments 
after Confederation. Tis complexity is best illustrated by reviewing the 
Grassy Narrows trial decision that is 1663 paragraphs long.38 Not included in 
that legal history is the work that the Indian Act administration has done to 
usurp governing authority from the Grand Council of the Boundary Waters 
Anishinaabe, including the Anishinaabe law and social structures that bound us 
together as one Nation. 
VI. GRAND COUNCIL AND THE WAR CHEST LITIGATION 
In 2011, I was asked by the Grand Chief to coordinate the development of rules 
to access the Bell Canada Funding (the war chest). Te resulting Consolidated 
Revenue Trust Fund (CRTF) rules were adopted in 2011 by the Grand Council 
Treaty 3. Again, the only dollars in the CRTF were the Bell Canada dollars and 
interest earned from investing those dollars, but it was a substantial war chest for 
litigation. Te frst litigation matter to access the fund had to be proposed in the 
National Assembly, be supported, and then voted on with more information, 
including a litigation budget, at a later Chiefs Assembly so that the amounts 
accessed would be certain and limited. A process was established and three pieces 
of litigation quickly went through: (1) Te Grand Council Treaty 3 intervention 
at the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the Grassy Narrows trial decision; (2) 
Te new Treaty Right to Education litigation; and (3) A judicial review of the 
decision that allowed the sale of dams owned by Abitibi Consolidated to H2O 
Power, as those dams had illegally fooded Treaty 3 reserves for over a century and 
was continuing to food the reserves without any form of easement.39 
I was in the room for these decisions and there was feeling of history being 
made for the “treaty right to education” litigation. Unfortunately, the strategy to 
38. See Keewatin 2011, supra note 10. 
39. See Kelly v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 1220 [Kelly 2013], Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy), 
2014 ONSC 5492 [Ogichidaakwe], Keewatin v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 
158 [Keewatin 2013]. 
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hunt down the treaty breakers was not transparent enough for the Nation and 
some dissent was sown within communities. 
Te Treaty 3 education litigation was the most divisive. As oral tradition 
people, the expectation is that all the impacted people would be in the room when 
a decision is made. With a claim this large, involving everyone as an education 
benefciary, many people felt left out of the decision-making process. Also, legal 
counsel for many First Nations examined the “Statement of Claim” document 
and had difering opinions on how the case was pleaded. Tese diferences of 
opinion were so key because unanimity was needed to proceed with this claim 
in court. As an insider, I was aware that the Statement of Claim was created as a 
strategy to bring Canada to the negotiation table. We had begun to collect data 
to show the gap in funding between our schools and mainstream schools, and we 
had begun a process of defning where we wanted our treaty right to education 
to take our communities, including culture and language curriculum and other 
key investments. Not everyone was able to put all of these pieces together and 
after about six months, there was open dissent about this litigation by some of 
the Chiefs. Tis was especially surprising to me, as this education claim was so 
celebrated when it was frst approved. 
Tere was less time spent on the intervention at the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario by the Grand Council Treaty 3 in the Grassy Narrows case, but it was the 
most successful of the three matters in litigation funded by the Treaty 3 war chest. 
I was personally very happy to read parts of the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
decision about Treaty 3:40 
Te principle of constitutional evolution has an important bearing upon treaties 
with First Nations. Treaties are solemn agreements and they are intended to last 
indefnitely. Te rights they guarantee are not frozen in time…Treaties must be 
capable of adapting to the natural evolution of the Constitution, which evolves 
as a “living tree” to meet “the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian 
society.” 
As the English Court of Appeal explained in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Afairs, ex parte Indian Association of Alberta, in relation to a challenge 
to proposals for constitutional change in 1982, if treaties are to be honoured by the 
Crown “so long as the sun rises and river fows,” treaty interpretation has to evolve 
along with the Constitution… 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal for Ontario understanding of the treaty 
as the Articles of a Treaty is underscored by reprinting those Articles at the end 
of their decision. Despite this, a step forward is made now that the Crown is 
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understood as both the provincial and federal governments, which is the opposite 
of what the plaintif, Grassy Narrows was arguing. Te provincial government is a 
necessary party to Treaty 3 because they hold a lot of the important constitutional 
authority with regard to treaty relationships. Now, with this signifcant change 
in the treaty dynamic, would there be no better reason at that time to have a 
treaty council? Unfortunately, no. Te Grassy Narrows decision of the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and all the 
intervening parties went forward with their interventions including the Grand 
Council Treaty 3.41 
At the same time, a judicial review about the sale of Abitibi-Consolidated’s 
hydroelectric dams to H2O Power Ltd. was also controversial.42 Tis judicial 
review was spurred on by lawyers for several claims related to fooding. Tat 
group of lawyers informally created the theory of the case for the judicial review. 
A law frm was hired that had no relationship with the food claim lawyers and 
that may have been detrimental to the success of the judicial review. Te fact 
that the legal team was fairly brand new to the Grand Council Treaty 3 was also 
an expensive problem. Te more interesting story for this article about treaty 
remedies and rights-claimants is how the judicial review and the trial on the 
treaty right to education had met a similar end in litigation, on the question of 
who was the proper representative. 
In Kelly v Canada (Attorney General),43 the Superior Court of Ontario agreed 
with Canada that the treaty claim against Canada was improperly pleaded in two 
ways: the plaintif was not the twenty-eight bands or a “proper representative” 
of those twenty-eight bands and the claim itself was non-justiciable, as it was a 
dispute on education policy of Canada, and the plaintif’s lawyer admitted that 
it was a strategy to get Canada to the negotiation table. However, upon appeal 
to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the claim was found to be justiciable and 
the Court agreed that the defect about proper representative of the twenty-eight 
bands could be fxed. Te Court decided that “Band Council Resolutions” 
41. Supra note 2. 
42. Ogichidaakwe, supra note 41. 
43. Kelly 2013, supra note 39 at paras 121, 156. 









would establish that the named plaintifs were the proper representatives of those 
twenty-eight First Nations for the treaty right to education claim.44 
In Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy),45 the Ministry of Energy and the Ontario 
Power Authority utilized the “Kelly order” to question the proper representative 
of the judicial review for the Treaty 3 claimants against the decision to allow the 
sale of the hydro dams. Te lawyers for the Grand Council Treaty 3 submitted to 
Justice Perrell that his original order in the education litigation was ofensive as 
it went against Anishinaabe custom. Justice Perrell shared that he understood the 
legal argument against the “Kelly order:”46 
Te Anishinaabe Nation is a community, and it is understandable that the Applicants 
would be discomfted and resistant to being ordered to sue other members of their 
community. And it is understandable, therefore, that the Applicants might view 
a Kelly v. Canada Order as ofensive to Aboriginal custom. And it would also be 
understandable that the more cynical and suspicious of the Applicants might 
harbour the unexpressed sentiment that a Kelly v. Canada Order could be used as a 
divide-and-conquer tactic in civil litigation against Aboriginal peoples. 
Notwithstanding the sympathy that the judge had for this argument, he felt 
that the order was necessary under the circumstances:47 
If, however, the Indian Bands do not agree with the Applicants’ assertion that they 
are the rights holder, then they necessarily should be joined as party respondents, 
precisely because they may be correct in their own assessment that they are rights 
holders and they should participate in the judicial review proceeding. Here, it bears 
44. See Kelly v Canada (AG), 2014 ONCA 92. Te case states: 
Tis is a fundamentally diferent challenge from that faced by the appellants before the motion 
judge. Moreover, as we have said, on this appeal hearing the Crown declined to specifcally 
identify those parts of the appellants’ pleading that allegedly run afoul of the requirement 
of justiciability. While the Crown, of course, is free to reconsider its position on the 
appellants’ proposed action, as currently framed, the altered basis for the Crown’s opposition 
to the appellants’ action as now advanced by the Crown results in evident unfairness to the 
appellants. Te appellants are entitled to know the case they have to meet on a pleadings 
challenge to their action… 
Accordingly, the appellants are granted leave to continue this proceeding as a representative 
action on behalf of themselves and all persons who are benefciaries of Treaty 3, and Grand 
Chief Warren White (who, as discussed below, replaces Grand Chief Diane Kelly) is 
appointed as the representative plaintif in the action, provided that (1) they are authorized 
to do so by band council resolutions of all 28 reserve bands, or (2) they join as party 
defendants those bands that do not authorize the representative action (ibid at paras 8, 21). 
45. Ogichidaakwe 2014, supra note 41. 
46. Ibid at para 9. 
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repeating that if all the putative Aboriginal rights holders are before the court, it 
becomes unnecessary to determine which of them is the genuine rights holder. 
Te adamancy of the Applicants’ assertion, therefore, undermines the Applicants’ 
assertion that it is beyond doubt that they are the rights holder, which I repeat they 
may well be, but that judicially remains to be seen. 
Te end result of the two judicial matters was that the plaintif/applicants 
were unable to bring twenty eight Band Council Resolutions to the court to 
evidence the proper representation in those cases. Additionally, the judicial 
review went well-beyond the budget received from the Grand Council Treaty 
3 for the preliminary matters and motions. Both matters received a fnite 
budget from the CRTF—under $300,000 for the judicial review and just over 
$1,000,000 for the education litigation. Te judicial review procedures had cost 
over $900,000. It was my initial belief that the over-spending on the part of the 
judicial review may have been the over-arching concern of the First Nations and 
may have been why the Band Council Resolutions were not forthcoming. Years 
later, I now understand that there were several process problems—we did not 
follow our original rules, so that created some mistrust and misunderstanding 
of these claims. 
Te irony of courts establishing other rules, including that the “proper 
representatives” of collective treaty claims are Indian Act bands, is not lost on 
the people that demanded that they be dealt with as a nation in the Treaty 
negotiations.48 It is regrettable that courts were not more receptive to the nature 
of the claims and who the plaintifs were and were less concerned about costs 
orders against these plaintifs. It was true to the adversarial nature of our treaty 
partner that they created the divisive “Kelly order” that ostensibly ended the once 
in a lifetime treaty litigation of the Grand Council Treaty 3. 
VII.NOW AFTER THE DUST HAS SETTLED ON OUR TREATY 
LITIGATION 
Fast forward to the 140th anniversary of Treaty 3, 3 October 2013, the Minister of 
Indian Afairs and other Federal executive representatives including the Governor 
General of Canada were invited, in advance, to celebrate the anniversary of 
48. Simon J Dawson, Memorandum in Reference to the Indians on the Red River Route
(2 June 1873), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (RG 10, vol 1904, fle 2235), 
online: <collectionscanada.gc.ca/pam_archives/index.php?fuseaction=genitem. 
displayEcopies&lang=eng&rec_nbr=2070938>. 











Treaty 3 between the Queen and the Boundary Waters Anishinaabeg.49 No one 
representing Canada bothered to attend.50 
Te fact that millions of dollars have been spent on the extraordinary 
remedy of litigation in such an unsuccessful strategy is lamentable. Te Bell 
Canada dollars from the twenty year agreement are no longer available to fll a 
war chest to hunt down treaty breakers. It was a once in a lifetime opportunity 
that may have been squandered by our inability to truly create a nation “of one 
mind” today. We have a far way to go to decolonize our processes and the road 
to treaty implementation. Te transparency and accountability of the litigation 
were lost in the way they were managed through the Grand Council Treaty 3. 
Te litigation, by necessity, became directed by Chiefs as they were the named 
plaintifs within the claims, and the nature of the litigation and strategy required 
there to be some confdentiality surrounding these discussions. Tis hurt the 
capacity of the nation to truly understand how we were hunting down the treaty 
breakers. It was a divide and conquer strategy called colonialism. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In my lifetime, I am consistently reminded of the rules that govern us 
rightly, otherwise known as Miinigoziiwin, that our Creator is given inherent 
authority. Literally, Miinigoziiwin means, what the Creator has given us. And, 
Mawendopenais explained a key concept to creating law and binding agreements 
for our Nation in the fnal statement after agreeing to Treaty 3:51 
I stand before the face of the nation and of the Commissioner. I trust there will 
be no grumbling. Te words I have said are the words of the nation and have not 
been said in secret but openly so all could hear and I trust that those who are not 
49. Te Grand Council Treaty 3 is a revitalized traditional government of the Boundary Waters 
Anishinaabeg. See for example, the Ogichidag bear clan mark on the Selkirk Treaty of 1817, 
and the Ogichidaa’s mark on an 1825 Treaty of Prairie du Chien that involved the United 
States of America to set a peace between the “Sioux” and the “Ojibwa” along the Great 
Lakes to assist the US fur trade. Te Selkirk Treaty (18 July 1817), online: <www.gov.mb.ca/ 
chc/archives/hbca/spotlight/selkirk_treaty.html>. Treaty between the United States and the 
Chippewa, Sauk, Fox, Menominee, Iowa, Sioux, Winnebago and a portion of the Ottawa, 
Chippewa, and Potawatomi Tribes of Indians living upon the Illinois, signed at Prairie des 
Chiens in the Territory of Michigan on 19 August 1825, online: <content.wisconsinhistory. 
org/cdm/ref/collection/tp/id/55638>. 
50. Jon Tompson, “First Nations Still Waiting for Federal Treaty Strategy”, Te 
Dryden Observer (10 October 2013), online: <thedrydenobserver.ca/2013/10/10/ 
frst-nations-still-waiting-for-federal-treaty-strategy>. 
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present will not fnd fault with what we are about to do today. And I trust, what 
we are about to do today is for the beneft of our nation as well as for our white 
brothers – that nothing but friendship should reign between the nation and our 
white brothers…. And now before you all, Indians and whites, let it never be said 
that this has been done in secret. It is done openly and in the light of day. 
Te CRTF decisions were meant to be better decisions about when treaty 
litigation would be funded by the litigation war chest. In hindsight, there was not 
a complete understanding about how to be more inclusive in the instructions and 
decision-making during the litigation amongst the Treaty 3 communities. 
Treaties are about relationships, I argue, they are not meant to create winners 
and losers. Te mutual benefts and the peace that resulted are the attraction to 
treaty relationships. Te fact that Canada is not mired in Indigenous-led violence 
is a testament to the strength and endurance of our treaty relationships and sacred 
obligations to those treaty orders that were created. Not that the Anishinaabe 
of the Boundary Waters were unaccustomed to using warfare to protect their 
interests. We had constant struggles in our border-relationships caused by 
earlier settler coercion, namely the American and British fur trade. We fought 
vigorously to be the “middle-men” in this fur trade and our “Sioux-Ojibway” 
disputes in Minnesota are central to that state’s early violent history of settlement 
there.52 Tere is also a very long-lasting peace that is in the collective memory of 
Indigenous peoples known as the Great Peace or the Great Law of Peace in and 
around the Great Lakes prior to any European contact. Tis peace was unsettled by 
the European settlement in the eastern shores of the United States moving inland. 
Treaties have a more special place in Canadian law than they are presently 
aforded. Tere is a misunderstanding in the common law that treaties are 
between the small Indian Act bands that may beneft from them today. Te fact 
is, Treaty 3 was a nation-to-nation treaty that allowed the east-west expansion of 
Canada into the west, and only the parties themselves should be able to change 
their own legal position vis-à-vis the treaty relationship, through consent or 
negotiated agreement. 
In R v Sioui, the Supreme Court of Canada has determined that treaties 
cannot be extinguished unilaterally by agreement between colonial powers:53 
It would be contrary to the general principles of law for an agreement concluded 
between the English and the French to extinguish a treaty concluded between the 
English and the Hurons. It must be remembered that a treaty is a solemn agreement 
between the Crown and the Indians, an agreement the nature of which is sacred: 
52. Mainville, “Treaty Councils,” supra note 1. 
53. R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1063. 







Simon, supra, at p. 410, and White and Bob, supra, at p. 649. Te very defnition 
of a treaty thus makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty cannot be 
extinguished without the consent of the Indians concerned. Since the Hurons had 
the capacity to enter into a treaty with the British, therefore, they must be the only 
ones who could give the necessary consent to its extinguishment. 
Te logical conclusion to treaty disputes is that the parties are required to 
resolve them through mutual agreement. No Canadian court has the powers and 
authorities to unilaterally change their terms or to do damage to the solemn, 
honourable reconciliation achieved between the parties over a century ago. What 
will be an important solution within these disputes is to allow Indigenous law and 
institutions of Indigenous law to participate in the resolution of these disputes 
and balancing the relationship with Crown governments. 
And, what has happened to the Queen’s ear? We know it is literally still 
available, but is it practically, no longer available to the Anishinaabe Nation? 
What would be the modern equivalent from Canada’s executive government 
of the government’s ear? I have argued this already in a much-earlier article 
on treaty councils.54 Tat was a decade ago, and very little has happened to 
begin a dialogue on what a treaty council would need to make it an acceptable 
treaty-based, fact-fnding, and dispute resolution mechanism. John Borrows 
shared this understanding almost twenty years ago, about treaty councils 55 
Tey believe that power was to be shared, and decisions about the treaties’ meanings 
were to be resolved through further treaty councils. Courts could take guidance 
from this perspective when faced with disputes over the meaning of treaties and send 
the parties back to peace and friendship councils to resolve their diferences through 
negotiation and agreement. 
Does this fully explain why the Anishinaabe continue to hold fast to Treaty 3? 
Unmistakably, the Anishinaabe Nation drove a hard bargain, it took more 
than three years and as many attempts to create an agreement known as Treaty 
3. Our existing relationship with the British, the Dawson Road annuity, and 
our relatives having a better treaty in Minnesota than the Lake Superior-based 
Anishinaabe had in Canada, informed our treaty discussions. An important 
development that we fashioned was our own version of terms to create an 1869 
“list of demands” much like the Queen’s representatives pre-fashioned terms 
in the “Articles of a Treaty” that was drafted in 1871. Te Anishinaabe would 
54. Mainville, “Treaty Councils,” supra note 1. 
55. John Borrows, “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples and the Royal Commission on 
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defnitely agree that the 1869 demands were not Treaty 3, and that the “Articles 
of Treaty” were not the treaty either. 
How novel would it have been to have demanded not just a parchment 
copy of the treaty as Chief Powassin and others had done after the treaty was 
concluded, but also that the treaty be written in their language as a record of 
the agreement in Anishinaabemowin? Te only Anishinaabemowin record was 
kept by the Anishinaabe “recorder” a person entrusted with the capacity to 
understand the full oral agreement in Anishinaabemowin, and he was given the 
responsibility to retell the various terms to the Grand Council into the future. 
An interesting symbolic act of reconciliation would be for both Nations to 
attempt to work together to establish the ofcial treaty record in both English 
and Anishinaabemowin, the impossibility of this would almost seem self-evident. 
If we cannot do this now, and I would argue even now this is an impossibility, 
why do people suppose or presume that this was achieved in 1873? Is it acceptable 
that Indigenous law and jurisdiction is also a “living tree” and treaties are rooted 
in the terms agreed to 1873, but created in symbolic language to ensure that 
the treaty relationship would last, “as long as the sun shines, the river fow, and 
the grasses grow, that is to say, forever.” Te living trees would be fed by the 
interpretative difculties, meeting together to come to a mutual understanding 
for today, then again in future years, and so on. 
A sui generis dispute resolution court could be the counter-balancing force 
that the former promise to “hunt down” treaty breakers was in 1873. Articles 
27 and 37 of UNDRIP are helpful in beginning that important treaty-based 
discussion on a truly nation-to-nation basis. 
Given the practical reality that a true written record of the terms of this 
treaty does not exist, why is it legally acceptable to bring a treaty such as Treaty 
3 to a Canadian court? Courts have been eager to convince themselves of the 
“principles of interpretation” found in common law,56 and that a principled 
approach by common law judges would equalize the interpretative difculties. 
Te result is winners and losers. Te adversarial system, some might even argue, 
would aford the parties a truly “fair” forum to advocate for various interpretations 
and fndings within the treaty itself. Tis is all outside of treaty-based dispute 
resolution to the detriment of the original understandings and the potential 
56. R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at para 78. 







actual agreement (or historic reconciliation) of 1873.57 To conclude, I want to 
share that the Anishinaabe refer to treaty between us and the Queen as “Manidoo 
Mazina’igan” which means the sacred paper. I doubt this is just the Articles of 
Treaty, given our long legacy of protecting the Paypom Treaty, our knowledge of 
the Nolin Notes and the “We have Kept our Part of the Treaty” document that 
lists the many treaty grievances by subject matter. Te sacred paper is part of the 
dispute resolution between us, the ingredients of a mutual understanding over the 
long history of our treaty relationship. We still strive for peace and understanding 
and the lasting friendship promised in 1873. Tat we can share all that is fne and 
good between us. 
57. As a practicing lawyer, I am presently working with both Aboriginal law informed by 
Anishinaabe Inakonigaawin, and helping my clients assert original inherent jurisdiction 
as their jurisdiction and staying away from delegations of Canadian legal authority as 
contingent jurisdiction. My strongest belief about Treaty 3 is that we insisted that our 
laws, “the rules that govern us rightly,” would continue to be co-existing jurisdiction in 
our territory. To that end, I am greatly interested in how law in Canada is required to be 
reconciliatory, and how judges can be trained to be better in helping in that purpose. See 
e.g. Mark D Walters, “Te Judicial Recognition of Indigenous Legal Traditions: Connolly v 
Woolrich at 150” (2017) 22 Rev Const Stud 374 at 376: 
Indigenous law is acknowledged not because it has been incorporated within another law, 
or because it has been impliedly (or expressly) accepted or sanctioned by a sovereign king or 
parliament, but rather because it is one of many bodies of law that can be shown to ft together 
in a manner that best refects the equal moral imperative of a normative order. 
